When the Market Hurts, Anomalies Heal
New Evidence on Factor Returns in Good and Bad Times
Larry Swedroe on investing, markets, and economic evidence.
New Evidence on Factor Returns in Good and Bad Times
For roughly four decades, large institutional investors have been moving capital from public equities toward private markets.
Every factor investor takes it on faith that the value, size, profitability, and investment factors are well-measured.
Private equity’s pitch to institutional investors has always rested on a simple story: PE managers generate returns public markets can’t match, and sophisticated allocators like pension funds are well-positioned to capture that premium.
Currency forecasting has a well-earned reputation as one of the hardest games in finance.
Investor disagreement—different investors hold disparate views about what a stock is worth—has long been considered one of the most promising building blocks for behavioral asset pricing theories.
While spreads have narrowed, they still support a positive outlook for value stocks.
In 2025, Zarattini, Aziz, and Barbon published a widely discussed paper, “Beat the Market: An Effective Intraday Momentum Strategy for S&P 500 ETF (SPY).” The strategy’s reported results were an eye-catching 19.6% annualized return and a Sharpe ratio of 1.33 f…
The degree to which information is incorporated into asset prices is inversely related to the cost of acquiring that information.
Practitioners have long relied on EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization) as the default measure of operating profitability for valuation.
Diversification has been called the only free lunch in investing, but many portfolios are less diversified than they appear because equity risk dominates.
Private markets are being sold to individual investors as the next great democratization story.
Traditional performance attribution asks a sensible question: did returns come from asset allocation, security selection, or their interaction?
One of the most durable findings in the empirical asset pricing literature is that stocks that are expensive to borrow — what researchers call “high-fee’’ stocks — go on to underperform by large amounts, for long periods of time.
Financial markets often are described as if they deliver a single, coherent verdict on a company’s value.
Private credit has grown to roughly $2.1 trillion globally.
Some of the best and most interesting research I read comes from Verdad Capital.
Every investment decision is, whether we admit it or not, a forecast.
Researchers argue that decades of falling interest rates distorted estimates of corporate bond risk premiums.
The stereotype of the retail investor as an undifferentiated mass of Robinhood traders chasing meme stocks has always been too simple.
One of the most well-documented patterns in the cross-section of stock returns is that firms with high asset growth subsequently underperform firms with low asset growth.
My June 5, 2026 Substack column analyzed the Calamos U.S.
U.S.
Insider trading laws are built around a simple idea: people who run companies know things the rest of us don’t.
Understanding risk exposures is critical for investing in stocks.
Evidence suggests investors targeting size and value premiums may achieve stronger long-term results by using one small-value fund instead of managing separate factor sleeves
If you’ve followed private credit headlines this year, you’ve probably seen default rate estimates ranging from under 1% to nearly 20% — often describing the same market in the same quarter. Fran Beyers, Head of Capital Markets at Cliffwater, addresses this di…
A new study says not the way you think.
Among the characteristics that have been shown to predict future stock returns is profitability—it’s included in two widely adopted benchmark pricing models: the Fama-French (2015) five-factor model and the Hou-Xue-Zhang (2015) q-factor model.
For decades, academics have documented an ever-growing list of stock return “anomalies” — patterns like momentum and low volatility that appear to generate returns unexplained by traditional risk models.