China’s Hidden Edge in Manufacturing.
China is embedding more service value added into its manufactured exports; the rest of the world is not.
Richard Baldwin on globalisation, trade, and the future of the world economy.
China is embedding more service value added into its manufactured exports; the rest of the world is not.
Since 2008, China out-built America five to one in factories. America out-built China two to one in offices.
China’s annual manufacturing expansion was larger relative to G7 output: 6.1% versus 4.1% during the first shock.
Cars rank eighth: China’s relative production volume rose in 18 of 19 sectors; relative prices fell in 19.
Since 2021, China’s world manufacturing share rose one point in volume but fell three points in value.
AI valuations assume access to foreign clients and Chinese kit. What could possibly go wrong?
2025 saw lots of new trade deals without much new trade.
With lobbyists, it's protection for sale, line by line; with populists, it's protection for show done in bulk.
Chinese subsidies sparked scale-induced productivity gains that tariffs didn’t counter.
The average tariff Americans pay has fallen by two-fifths.
The world didn’t close. China became a mega-economy.
Nobody, since 2013.
Globally, the Office out-pays the Factory by about two-thirds per trade-linked job.
Will ChatGPT purge back-office offshoring? The data say ‘no.’.
Manufacturing slowbalisation was actually delocalisation (mostly to China).
How Tax Law Handed Ireland the World Cup of Digital-Services Exports.
The EU offshored to itself, ran a manufacturing trade surplus, and then there was Ireland.
Standard measures say China is deindustrialising along with the G7. But that’s not real.
No. While America lost its appetite for manufactures, the others shifted value added shares offshore.
Less wanted, more imported, more offshored. The first did most of the damage; the third never happened.
“Chinese overproduction caused America’s trade deficit” and “US underproduction caused China’s surplus” are the same sentence read in opposite directions.
China rerouting its US-bound exports is being dressed up as geopolitical fragmentation.
Goods exports make the politics; service exports make the jobs.
The problems are not acute but treating them as such might make things worse.
Why the rest of the world defended rules-based trade while the US turned inward.
By Richard Baldwin, Professor at IMD Business School, 8 May 2026.
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